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(Hug, Ferguson, Chambers, 
dissenting) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. SUN~ffiRY: The SG challenges the CA 9's ~tan~ards for judging the 
legality of vehicle stops by Border Patrol officers. 
2. FACTS: Following jury trials, resps were convicted of trans-
porting illegal aliens in vioJ.ation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (2). Resps 
filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an allegedly 
illegal stop by Dorder Patrol officers. The evidence at the pre-trial 
suppression hearing establishe~ that early in December 1976, Border 
._; Patrol officers patrolling a sparcely popula teo area of the f1ex ican 
border near Sells, Arizona, began investigating footprint patterns sug-
7k; WtU 4.A Cit~~~ F Y' ,~ eoe'~* :r ~ ~ r- 4.e-...~uu) ~~ 
~~ fld fk; ~ ,; .. ~ --r~ ~~~ 
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( gesting illegal immigration. Footprints indicated that on a number of 
occasions groups of from 8 to 20 persons had walked north from the 
Mexican border across 30 miles of desert and mountains to an isolated 
area on Highway 86, an east-west highway in Arizona. One recurring shoe 
print was of a distinctive chevron design. The officers knew that the 
area through which the groups passed was heavily used by aliens illegally 
entering the country, and they concluded that a person (whom they 
referred to as ''Chevron'') was guiding groups of aliens across the border 
and north to a place on Highway 86 where they would be piclted up by a 
vehicle. 
Investigation led the officers to a number of additional con-
clusions. They had reason to believe that the groups travelled at night, 
during clear weather, and on or near weekends. In addition, the tracks 
around Highway 86 indicated that the aliens, when they reached the high-
way, would walk parallel to the road for several miles in an eastward 
direction, and then turn directly north to the highway and disappear. 
From this the officers concluded that the groups were probably picked up 
by a vehicle that approached them from the east, since it was unlikely 
that the aliens, after a long overland march, would walk along the high-
way away from the vehicle that was corning to meet them. They also in-
ferred that the vehicle probably returned to the east since it was un-
likely that the aliens w6uld be walking away from their ultimate desti-
nation. 
Armed with this information, two officers who had been involved in 
the Chevron tracks investigation devised criteria for identifyi~g a 
vehicle which might be transporting Chevron and illegal aliens. On the 
evening of January 30, 1977, the two officers decided to station them-




the Chevron-led groups had been picked up. The officers had no d irect 
information suggesting that Chevron would be leading a group that 
evening. Nonetheless, the officers believed it might be a likely ·time 
since it was a Sunday and the first clear night after a three-~ay period 
of rain. The officers estimated that if Chevron did lea~ a group that 
night, they would probably be picked up between 2:00 and 6:00 a.m. on 
January 31, in accordance 0ith the officers' estimate of the travelling 
I 
time. The officers decided to watch particularly for a camper, van, or 
similar vehicle that was capable of concealing a fairly large group. The 
officers therefore determined that they would stop any camper or similar 
vehicle that passed the officers in a westward direction, in the early 
morning hours of January 31, and which returned eastward approximately 
one and one half hours later. 
Two of the 20 vehicles which passed the Border Patrol officers that 
morning were pick-up trucks with camper shells. The first camper passe d 
them at 4:30 a.m. travelling in a westward direction, and passed them a 
second time, travelling in an eastward direction at 6:12 a.m. Since the 
vehicle fit the profile formulated by the officers, they stopped the 
camper. The officers identified themselves and told the driver that they 
were conducting an immigration check. They asked resp Cortez if there 
was anyone in the camper. Cortez stated that he had picked up some 
hitchhikers and proceeded to open the back of the camper. The officers 
established that the six persons in the back were aliens. The passenger 
/fiJ! in the front seat \vore the tell-tale Chevron shoes. 
3. DECISIONS BELOW: The DC denied the motion to suppress. The CA 
c- reversed, holding that the officers lacked reasonable cuspicion justi-
fying the stop of the camper. The CA reasoned that United States v. ---------




stop the vehicle was not constitutionally required. Rather, a ''founded 
suspicion" was all that Has necessary. A founded suspicion could not, 
however, be based merely on a profile, in the judgment of the CA. The 
stop was not grounded on a founded suspicion because it was "solely a 
product of a profile, not of facts associated with the indivi~ual, his 
behavior, or the specific appearance of his vehicle. Officers did not 
sec anything suspicious about the vehicle itself, nor did they have 
specific information about illegal movement of aliens in the area that 
night. The court concluded, therefore, that the circumstances ''furnished 
far too many innocent inferences to make the officers' suspicions 
reasonably warranted." 
Judge Chambers dissented. The dissent concluded that in the facts of 
this case, the suspicion which was based on skillful police analysis, was 
not "unfounded" under Brignoni-Ponce. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the decision of the CA essen-
tially precludes law enforcement officers from formulating a "founded 
suspicion" on the basis of merely circumstantial evidence. The SG states 
that this distinction in the nature of evidence necessary to support a 
suspicion is contrary to this Court's cases. In- Brignoni-Ponce, the 
Court recognized that numerous circumstantial factors could he taken into 
account in deciding whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop a car 
in the border area. The court specifically approved consideration of 
proximity to the border, usual traffic pa tterns on a road, previous ex-
perience with alien traffic, information about recent illegal border 
crossings, the driver's behavior, and the suitability of the vehicle for 
transporting concealed aliens. 422 U.S. at 884-885. The SG ar0ues that 
these factors indicate the legality of the stop. Resps rely on the deci-




5. DISCUSSION: The decision of the CA is questionable under the 
standards articulated by this Court in Brignoni-Ponce itself. Further-
more, the Court has recently suggested that stops undertaken in accor-
dance with neutral law enforcement criteria may presumably be valid. See 
Bro\;n v. Texas, 47 USLW 4810, 4811 (June 25, 1979). Granting cert may 
not be necessary since the Court may address the validity of profile 
stops in United States v. r1endcnhall, 78-1821 (cert granted Oct. 1, 
1979). In Mendenhall, an airline passenger was stopped for questioning 
in an airport by Drug Enforcement Administration agents on the basis of a 
drug courier profile. The facts supporting the profile in Oen~enhall 
were far less indicative of the likelihood of criminal behavior than the 
profile utilized by the law enforcement officers in this case. There-
fore, if the Court in Mendenhall holds that the drug courier profile sup-
ported a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, it would appear ap-
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~~nited States v. Cortez. The 
case is whether two border agents reasonably 
question in this he_ 
suspected that the ~ 
I 
vehicle driven by the respondent contained illegal aliens, 
which it did. The agents' suspicions rested on circumstantial 
evidence suggesting that illegal aliens were being transported 
to the interior by a truck or camper from an isolated point 
along a highway, 25 miles north of the Mexican border. From 
footprints in the desert sand, the agents concluded that the 
aliens came over the border by foot at night and were met by a 
vehicle travelling from the east, and which was assumed to 
~ I 
return in the same direction. Calculating the timing of the ~~ 
march and the rendezvous, on a night following several nights ~· 
~~~) 
of inclement weather, the agents stopped the one vehicle that 
fit their inferences. The district court denied the moti~-
suppress, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed (CA9; Hug, 
Ferguson; Chambers, diss'g), concluding that there were no 
facts focusing suspicion on the respondent's vehicle, and that 
there were "far too many innocent inferences to make the 
officers' suspicions reasonably warranted." Although the 
question is for me a close one, I do not think that the 
elaborate inferences on which the agents acted in this case are 
typical, and thus that plenary review would be useful. Since 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell November 21, 1980 
From: Paul Smith 
No. 79-404: United States v. Cortez 
Question Presented 
Whether it was constitutional, under the Fourth 
Amendment, for two border agents to stop petitioners' vehicle, 




Petitioners were arrested after being stopped while 
driving in a camper truck that also contained six illegal 
aliens. Petitioner Hernandez wore shoes with a distinctive, 
"Chevron" tread. --- Tracks with this tread had been observed while border agents were tracking at least four separate 
trails from the Mexican border up to Highway 86, where this 
stop took place. These trails showed that a pers_£n wearing 
the Chevron shoes had repeatedly been part of groups of people 
hiking the 25 miles from the border to the highway--at night 
and without rests. In addition, captured illegal aliens had 
previously identified their guide as a man wearing these 
shoes. 
The four trails were actually tracked on two 
occasions. On Tuesday January 4, Agent Gray followed one 
track that was "a day or two old," and another that was 
approximately a week old. On Sunday January 16, Agents Gray 
and Rayburn saw one set of tracks that was from the previous 
night, and another set that was perhaps three or four days 
old. The tracks turned east when they reached Highway 86, an 
east-west road, and paralleled the roadway for four miles 
until they reached Milepost 122, where they disappeared into 
the roadway. 
Based on these facts, Agents Gray and Evans 
suspected that "Chevron" tended to take groups over the border 
on weekend nights, leaving in early evening so as to arrive at 
3. 
Highway 8 6 before dawn. They were particularly suspicious 
about the night of Sunday, January 30, because it was preceded 
by several days of rain that would have made such a hike 
difficult. During the early morning hours of January 31, they 
were posted at Milepost 149, 27 miles east of Chevron's normal 
pick-up point, where they could watch traffic coming up a side 
road from the south, as well as traffic on Highway 86 itself. 
They felt that the vehicle meeting the group woud probably 
come from the east, because the previous groups had headed in 
that direction when they reached the highway. Based on their 
e~ce, they articularly suspicious of large 
vehicles that could carry groups. They also calculated the 
time at which a rendezvous would be expected, and the amount 
of time required to pass them by heading westward, pick up a 
group, and return to their location. 
Petitioners' was one of two campers that passed the 
officers heading west. It returned one hour and forty minutes 
later, just about as they had calculated. They stopped the 
camper, and petitioner Cortez got out immediately from the 
driver seat. They observed someone move a curtain in the 
rear, and asked Cortez whether there were people inside. He 
stated that he had picked up some hitchhikers, and opened the 
rear door without being asked to do so. 1 The six undocumented 
lpetitioners dispute this version of how the camper door was 
opened. The Court is, however, probably bound to accept the 
4. 
aliens were inside. Petitioner Hernandez was in the passenger 
seat. 
Discussion 
This case presents a single, distinct issue--whether 
the facts known to the officers were sufficient to create 
"reasonable suspicion," justifying their stop of the camper 
for The seminal case in this area is, of 
course, vTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which established 
that some limited seizures may be justified by less than 
probable cause. 
./' 
More recently, in United States v. Br ignoni-Ponce, 
422 u.s. 873 (1975), your opinion for the Court discussed the 
application of Terry to the context of vehicle stops near the 
Mexican border. You held that random stops, or stops based 
solely on the Mexican appearance of a driver, were 
government's version, since the motion to suppress was denied 
in the district court and the CA9 's ruling was a legal one, 
that did not dispute any factual conclusions the district 
court could have reached. Unfortunately, the record (at least 
the printed materials) does not contain findings by the 
district court. 
2There can be 'no question, on these facts, about whether 
there was a "seizure" here, for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Moreover, it is 
clear that the seizure was a minimal stop for questioning, not 
a full search requiring probable cause. Cortez opened the 
camper voluntarily. And the fact that the officers may have 
intended to conduct a full search is irrelevant. 
5. 
unconstitutional, but elaborated on the various factors that 
may create reasonable suspicion:3 
Officers may consider the characteristics of the 
area in which they encounter a vehicle. Its 
proximity to the border, the usual patterns of 
traffic on the particular road, and previous 
experience with alien traffic are all relevant. 
They also may consider information about recent 
illegal border crossing in the area. The driver's 
behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or 
obvious attempts to evade officers can support a 
reasonable suspicion. Aspects of the vehicle 
itself may justify suspicion. For example, officers 
say that certain station wagons, with large 
compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires, are 
frequently used for transporting concealed aliens. 
The vehicle may appear to be heavily loaded, it 
may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or 
the officers may observe persons trying to hide .... 
The Government also points out that trained officers 
can recognize the characteristic appearance of 
persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors 
as the mode of dress and haircut. In all 
situations the officer is entitled to assess the 
facts in light of his experience in detecting 
illegal entry and smuggling. 
Id. at 884-85 (citations omitted). 
This list of factors suggests that the overall set 
of circumstances in this case was sufficient to create ~ 
reasonable suspicion. Any single factor might have had an 
-------------~ 
innocent explanation, but in combination they created grounds 
3see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. 543 
(1976) (short stops for questioning are permissible at a 
permanent checkpoint even in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) 
(searches without probable cause not permissible even at a 
checkpoint) . 
6. 
for a stop. Even then, of course, the officers might have 
stopped an innocent party, but the Fourth Amendment does not 
require certainty in this context. In sum, this case is 
relatively easy, since there were substantial grounds for the 
----......,...; 
officers' suspicions. 
To begin with, as Brignoni-Ponce anticipated, there 
were several character is tics of the camper itself that were 
suspicious: 
The Nature of the Vehicle--This camper was large enough to 
carry a group of aliens. Few of the vehicles that passed by 
that night were this large. Although the officers testified 
that their suspicions were not aroused by two "linen trucks," 
that judgment seems reasonable. In addition, petitioners 
point out that the officers did not take notice of any station 
wagons that may have passed by, even though these might 
contain up to eight persons. But this may be explained by the 
fact that officers knew that Chevron generally had brought in 
groups larger than that. 
The Location of the Vehicle: This camper was driving in a 
relatively isolated desert area near the border late at night. 
The Activities of the Vehicle: The camper headed west on the 
highway and returned east, suggesting that it had completed an 
errand in this relatively desolate area. 
In addition, as the SG points out, the officers had 
good cause to be especially suspicious on the night in 
question. At least three of the previous four hikes involving 
7. 
Chevron seemed to have taken place on weekends. This was a 
clear Sunday night preceded by three days of rain. Moreover, 
since the hikers had always turned east in the past after 
reaching Highway 86, there was at least some reason to believe 
that they were meeting a vehicle coming from the east. 
Finally, the amount of time between the first sighting of the 
camper and its return heading the opposite direction was one 
hour and forty minutes. The camper was driving about 50 miles 
per hour and had to cover 27 miles, find the group, load them 
up, and return 27 more miles. It was quite reasonable for the 
officers to estimate that this process would take about one 
and a half hours. 
Based on these facts, your opinion in United States 
v. Mendenhall, 48 U.S.L.W. 4575 (1980), requires a finding 
reasonable suspicion. It is obviously important for the 
government to stop the smuggling of illegal aliens (although 
this interest is arguably less important than the stopping of 
drug trafficking), and these officers were making use of their 
special expertise in tracking smugglers. This case is 
distinguishable from Reid v. Georgia, 48 U.S.L.W. 3847 (1980) 
(per curiam summary reversal), where the airport stop was 
based on almost no suspicious factors. There, the petitioners 
had been stopped because they had taken an early morning 
flight from Fort Lauderdale, carried only shoulder bags, and 
had occasionally looked at each other while walking 
separately. Id. at 3847-48. The Court emphasized that 
8. 
evidence this minimal could subject travellers to virtually 
random stops. In my view, however, the present case presents 
no such danger. The factors leading to this stop pointed to 
petitioners' camper with great particularity. 
Summary 
The officers who made this stop had good reason to 
suspect that petitioners would be bringing in a group on the 
night in question. They had reason to believe that the 
vehicle meeting the group would come from the east in the 
early morning hours, taking about one and one-half hours 
between the time it first passed them until its return. They 
also had reason to be suspicious about a camper vehicle 
following such a route in this desolate area late at night. 
Based on the above, I would hold that "reasonable suspicion" 
existed, justifying the limited stop. Any other holding, it 
seems to me, would tend to eliminate the distinction between 
reasonable suspicion and actual probable cause. 
-
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From: The Chief Juat1oe 
suPREME couRT oF THE uNITED TArmd: JAN 9 1981 
No. 79-404 Recirculated:------
United States, Petitioner, 
On Writ of Certiorari to the-
v. 
United States Court of Appeals · 
Jesus E. Cortez and Pedro for the Ninth Circuit. 
Hernandez-Loera. 
[January -. 1981] 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGEH delivered the opinion of the Court .. 
We granted certiorari to consider whether objective facts 
and circumstantial evidence suggesti11g that a particular 
v0hicle is involved in criminal activity may provide a suffi-
cient basis to justify an investigative stop of that vehicle. 
I 
Late in 1976, Border Patrol officers patrolling a sparsely 
populated section of southern central Arizona found human 
footprints in the desert. In time. other sets of similar foot-
prints were discovered in the same area. From these sets 
of footprints, it was deduced that, on a number of occasions. 
groups of from 8 to 20 persons had walked north from the 
Mexican border. across 30 miles of desert and mountains. 
over a fairly well-defined path. to an isolated point on High-
way 86. an cast-west road running roughly parallel to the 
Mexican border. 
Officers observed that one recurring shoeprint bore a dis-
tinctive repetitive V-shape, or chevron. design. Because the 
officers knew from recorded experience that the area through 
which the groups passed was heavily trafficked by aliens illeg-
ally entering the country from Mexico. they surmised that a 
person, whom they gave the case-name "Chevron." was guid-
ing aliens illegally into tho United States over the path 
79-404-0PINT0'\1" 
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marked by the tracks to a point "·here they could be picked 
up by a vehicle. 
The tracks led into or over obstacles that would have been 
avoided in daylight. From this, the officers deduced that 
"Chevron" probably led his groups across the border and to 
the pick-up point at night. Moreover, based upon the times 
when they had discovered the distinctive sets of tracks, they 
concluded that "Chevron" generally travelled during or ncar 
weekends and on nights when the weather was clear. 
Their tracking disclosed that when "Chevron's" groups 
came within 50 to 75 yards of Highway 86, they turned right 
and walked eastward, parallel to the road. Then. approxi-
mately at highway milepost 122, the tracks would turn north 
and disappear at the road. From this pattern. the officers 
concluded that the aliens very likely 'wre picked up by a ve-
hicle-probably one approaching from the east, for after a 
long overland march the group was most likely to walk parallel 
to the highway toward the approaching vehiclr. The officers 
also concluded that, after the pick-up. the vehicle probably 
returned to the east. because it '"as unlikely that thr group 
would be walking away from its ultimate destination. 
On the Sunday night of January 30- 31. 1977. officers Grny 
and Evans, two Borrler Patrolmen '"ho had been pursuing 
the investigation of "Chevron." \Yere on duty in the C'asa 
Grandr area. The latest set of observed "Chevron" tracks 
had been made on Saturday, January 15-16. January 30- 31 
"·as the first clear night after three clays of rain. For these 
rra.sons. Gray and Evans decided there was a strong possi-
bility that "Chevron" would leacl aliens from the border to 
the highway that night. 
The officers assumed that. if "Chevron" did conduct a group 
that night, he would not leave Mexico until after dark. that 
iR. about 6 p.m. They knc'" from their experience that 
groups of this sort, travelling on foot. cover about two and a 
half to three miles an honr. Thus. the 30-mile journey would 
take from 8 to 12 hours. From this. the officers calculntf'Cl 
79-404-0PINION 
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that "Chenon" and his group would arrive at Highway 86 
somewhere between 2 a. m. and 6 a. m. on January 31. 
About 1 a. m .. Gray and Evans parked their patrol car on 
an elevated location about one hundred feet off Highway RG 
at milepost 149, a point some 27 miles cast of milepost 122. 
From their vantage point, they could see passing vehicles by 
the moonlight. They estimated that it \YOuld take approxi-
mately one hour and a half for a vehicle to make a round trip 
from their vantage point to milepost 122. Working on the 
hypothesis that the pick-up vehicle approached milepost 122 
from the east and thereafter returned to its starting point. 
they focused upon vehicles that passed them from the east 
and. after about one hour and a half, passed them returning 
to the east. 
Because "Chevron" appeared to lead groups of between 8 
and 20 aliens at a time. the officers deduced that the pick-up 
vehicle would be one that was capable of carrying that a large 
group without arousing suspicion. For this reason. and bc-
canse they knew that certain types of vehicles "·ere commonly 
used for smuggling sizable groups of aliens. they decided to 
limit their attention to vans. pick-up trucks. small trucks. 
campers, motor homes. and other similar vehicles. 
Traffic on Highway 86 at milepost 149 was normal for the 
time of day of the officers' surveillance. In the five-hour 
1)eriod between 1 a. m. and 6 a. m., 15 to 20 vehic1cs passed 
the officers heading west. toward milepost 122. Only tiro of 
thcm.-both pick-up trucks with camper shells-were of the 
kind that the officers had concluded "Chevron" " ·ould likely 
use if he was to carry aliens that night. One. a distinctively 
colorrd pick-up truck with a camper shell, passed for the first 
time at 4:30 a. m. Agent Gray was able to sec and record 
only a partial licc'l1se number. "GN 88-." 1 At 6:12 a. m .. 
almost exactly the estimated one hour and a half later. a 
1 Tho second camper p:t>'sod thrm 15 or 20 minutr:; Inter. A;; fur a~ 
thr record shows, it did not. return. 
70-404-0PI::\TION 
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vehicle looking like this same pick-up passed them again. this 
time heading east. 
The officers follo,ved the pick-up and were satisfied from 
its license plate, "GN 8804." that it \vas the same vehicle 
that had passed at 4:30 a. m. At that point, they flashed 
their police lights and intercepted the vehicle. Respondent 
Jesus Cortez was the driver and owner of the pick-up; re-
spondent Pedro Hernanclez-Lorea was sitting in the passen-
ger's seat. Hernandez-Lorea \YaS wearing shoes with soles 
matching the distinctive "chevron" shoeprint. 
The officers iclen tified themselves and told Cortez they were 
conducting an immigration check. They asked if he ''"as 
carrying any passengers in the camper. Cortez told them 
he had picked up some hitchhikers, and he proceeded to open 
the back of the camper. In the camper, there were six illegal 
aliens. The officers then arrested the respondents. 
Cortez and Hernanclez-Lorea were charged ;vith six counts 
of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. ~ 1324 
(a). By pretrial motion, they sought to suppress the e\·i-
clence obtained by Officers Gray and Evans as a result of 
stopping their vehicle. They argued that the officers did not 
have adequate cause to make the investigative stop. The 
District Court denied the motion. A jury found the respond-
ents guilty as charged. They were sentenced to concurrent 
prison terms of five years on each of six counts. In addition. 
Hernanclez-Lorea was fined $12.000. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for tlw Kin th Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the officers lacked a sufficient basis 
to justify the stop of the pick-up. 595 F. 2d 505 (1979). 
That court recognized that United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U. S. 873 (1975). provides a standard governing investi-
gative stops of the kind involved in this case, stating: 
"The quantum of cause necessary in ... cases flike 
this one] was established in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce. '[Olfficers on roving patrol may stop vehicles 
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, to-
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gcthcr with rational inferences from those facts, that 
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain 
aliens who may be illegally in the country.' " 595 F. 2d) 
at 507 (quoting Um'ted Stales v. Brignoni-Ponce, supm, 
at 884) (citations omitted). 
The court also recognized that "the ultimate question on ap-
]X'al is whether the trial judge's finding that founded suspicion 
was present here was clearly erroneous." Ibid. Here, be-
cause, in the vie\v of the facts of the two judges constituting 
the majority, "rtlhe officers did not have a valid basis for 
singling out the Cortez vehicle," id., at 508, and because the 
circumstances admitted "far too many innocent inferences to 
make the officers' suspicions reasonably warrantrd," ibid., 
the panel concluded that the stop of Cortez' vehicle lvas a vio-
lation of the respondents' rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment. In dissent. Judge Chambers was persuaded that 
Brignoni-Ponce recognized the validity of permitting an offi-
crr to assess the facts in light of his past experience. 
II 
A 
The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person. 
including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of the 
vehicle here. Reid v. Georgia, - U. S. -, - (1980); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S .. supra, at 878; 
Davis v. Mississipp1:, 394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S. 1, 16-19 (1968). An investigatory stop must be l 
.i ustified by some objective manifestation that the person 
stopped is. or is about to be. engaged in criminal activity. 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U. S. 648, 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 884; A dams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146-149 
(1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16-19. 
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive 
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop 
79-404-0PINION 
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a person. Terms like "probable cause" and "articulable rca- -
sons" or "founded suspicion' are not self-defining; they fall 
short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad 
factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has 
hPen written is that the totality of the circumstances--the 
"·hole picture-must be taken into account. Based upon that 
whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity. See. e. g., Brown v. Texas, . 
supra, at 51; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 884. 
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must 
yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements. each 
of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First. 
the assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances .. 
The analysis proceeds with various objective observations. 
information from police rf'ports. if such are available and 
consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of cer-
tain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data. a trained officer· 
draws inferences and makes deductions-inferences and de-
ductions that might well <:'lude an untrained person. 
The process does not deal with hard certainties. but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was artic-
ulatf'd as such. practical people formulated certain common-
S<'nse conclusions about human behavior; .i urors as factfinders 
are permitted to do th<' same-and so are law enforcement 
officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and 
"·eighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars. but as 
understood by thosr versed in the field of law enforcement. 
The secm1d element contained in the idea that an assess-
ment of the whole picture must yield a particulariz<'cl sus-
picion is the concept that the process just describ<'cl must 
rais<' a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped 
is engaged in "Tongdoing. C'hid Justic<' Warren. speaking 
for the Court in Terry v. Ohio, s~tpra, said. "[tlhis demand 
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for specificity in the information upon which police action is 
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence." Id., at 21 , n. 18 (emphasis 
added. See also, Brown v. Texas, supra, at 51; Delaware v. 
Prouse, supra, at 661-663; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,. 
supra, at 884. 
B 
This case portrays at once both the enormous difficulties of 
patrolling a 2,000-mile open border and the patient skills 
needed by those charged with halting illegal entry into this 
country. It implicates all of the principles just discussed-
especially the imperative of recognizing that. when used by 
trained law enforcement officers. objectives facts. meaningless 
to the untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions 
from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a 
particular person-and action on that suspicion. We seE:" 
here the kind of police work often suggested by judges and 
scholars as examples of appropriate and reasonable means of 
law enforcement. Here. fact on fact and clue on clue af-
forded a basis for the deductions and infPrcnces that brought 
the officers to focus on "Chevron." 
Of critical importance. the agents knew that the area was 
a crossing point for illegal alirns. They knew that it was 
common practice for persons to lead aliens through the desert 
from the border to Highway 86. where they could-by pre-
arrangement--be picked up by a vehicle. Moreover. based 
upon clues they had discovered in the two-month period 
prior to the events at issue herr. they brlirved that one such 
guide. whom they designated "C'hrvron." had a particular 
pattern of operations. 
By piecing together the information at their disposal, thr 
officers tentatively concluded that there was a reasonable 
likelihood that "Chevron" 'vould attPmpt to lead a group of 
aliens on the night of Sunday. January 30-31. Somconr with 
chevron-soled shoes had led sevrral groups of aliens in the· 
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]'JJ"'C"vious two monthsJ yet it hacl been two weeks since the 
latest crossing. "Chevron.'' they deduced, was therefore due 
reasonably soon. "Chevron" tended to travel on clear week-
end nights. Because it had rained on the Friday and Satur-
'(lay nights of the weekend involved here, Sunday was the 
only clear night of that weekend; the officers surmised it 
IYa~ therefore a likely night for a trip. 
Once they had focused on that night, the officers drew upon 
other objective facts known to them to deduce a time frame 
1vithin which "Chevron" and the aliens were likely to arrive. 
From what they knew of the practice of those who smuggle 
aliens, including what they kne'v of "Chevron's" previous ac-
tivities. they deduced that the border crossing and journey 
through the desert would probably be at night. They knew 
th0 time when sunset would occur at the point of the border 
crossing; they knew about how long the trip lvould take. 
They were thus able to deduce that "Chevron" \Yould likely 
arrive at the pick-up point on Highway 86 in the time frame 
between 2 a. m. and 6 a. m. 
From objective facts, the officers also deduced the probable 
point on the highway-milepost 122-at which "Chevron" 
would likely rendezvous with a pick-up vehicle milepost 122. 
They deduced from the direction taken by the sets of "Chev-
ron" footprints they had earlier discovered that the pick-up 
vehicle would approach the aliens from, and return ''"ith 
them to, a point east of milepost 122. They therefore staked 
out a position east of milepost 122 (at milepost 149) ancl 
watched for vehicles that passed them going west and then, 
approximately one and a half hours later, passed them again, 
this time going east. 
From what they had observed about the previous groups 
guided by the person with chevron shoes, they deduced that 
"Chevron" would lead a group of 8 to 20 aliens. They there-
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The analysis produced by officers Gray and Evans can be 
summarized as follows: if, on the night upon ·which they 
believed "Chevron" was likely to travel. sometime between 
2 a. m. and 6 a. m .. a large enclosed vehicle was seen to make 
a east-west-east round trip to and from a deserted point 
(milepost 122) on a deserted road (High"'·ay 86 )) the officers 
would stop the vehicle 011 the return trip. In four-hour 
prriod the agents observed only one vehicle meeting thn.t 
description. And is it not surprising that7 when they stopped 
the vehicle on its rC'turn trip it contained "Chevron" and 
several illegal aliens.~ 
c 
The limited purpose of the stop in this case was to question 
the occupants of the vehicle about their citizenship and 
immigration status and the reasons for the round trip in a 
short time span in a virtually deserter! area. No search of 
the camper or any of its occupants occurred until after re-
spondent Cortez voluntarily opened the back door of the 
cam perf ; thus, only the stop. not the search is at issue here. 
There intrusion upon privacy associated with this stop was 
limited and was "reasonably related in scope to the justifica-
tion for [its] initiation." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29. 
We have recently held that stops by the Border Patrol may 
be justified under circumstances less than those constituting 
probable cause for arrest or search. United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. In no other way can there be any 
meaningful control over the illegal entry of aliens. Thus, 
~In Brignoni-Poncr. supm, at &'l4-885, the Court li&1ed seYernl farton, 
io he con10idered a~ part of the totality of ihe circumstances in determining 
thr existence vel nou of a particularized su~picion in cases treating official 
attempts to stem the infl11x of illrgal aliens into our country. Though the 
li~t did not purport to be rxhau~ti\'l', it i' notrworthy that several of thr 
factors present here were recognized by Brignoni-Ponce as significant in 
thi:< context; for examplr, information about rrrent bordrr cros~ings nne! 
thr t~·pe of vehicle invoh·ecl . 
• ~~ .. .... ., 
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the test is not whether officers Gray and Evans had probable· 
cause to conclude that the vehicle they stopped would con-
tain "Chevron" and a group of illegal aliens. Rather the 
question is whether, based upon the whole picture, they, as 
experienced Border Patrol agents, could reasonably surmise 
that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in crimi-
nal activity. On this record, they could so conclude. 
Reversed .. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 80-404 Prince Edward School Foundation v. 
United States 
While I think that the question of whether the regulation , 
of the IRS is ''fairly subsumed" within the questions presented, 
see Pet. inside cover, in order to avoid the possibility that 
a majority of us would conclude after argument that it was 
not, or that the argument on it was not sufficiently targeted, 
I suggest that in addition to the order granting certiorari 
the following language be appended: 
"The parties are requested to brief, in 
addition to any other issues they desire, 
the following question: 
'Does §50l(c) (3) authorize the 
Internal Revenue Service to deny 
tax-exempt status to a private 
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Dear Chief: 
I have written you a separate join note. 
In reading your description of the cause required 
to justify an investigative stop, you state that such a stop 
•must be justified by some objective manifestation that the 
person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal 
activity." 
I have thought that an officer also may stop a 
person for questioning if he has reasonable grounds for 
believing the individual is wanted for alleged criminal 
conduct in the past. Do you think it is desirable to add a 
footnote to this effect? 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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Dear Lewis: 
To be on the "safe" side I will add a footnote 
"Of course an officer may stop and 
question a person if there is 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
person is wanted for past criminal 
conduct". 
Justice Powell 
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dissent unless you do ~~-
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